The fight to keep resistance at bay, epidemiology of carbapenemase producing organisms (CPOs), vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) and methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in Norway, 2006-2017 by Elstrøm, Petter et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The fight to keep resistance at bay,
epidemiology of carbapenemase producing
organisms (CPOs), vancomycin resistant
enterococci (VRE) and methicillin resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in Norway,
2006 - 2017




1 Department of Antibiotic Resistance and Infection Prevention, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo,
Norway, 2 Norwegian National Advisory Unit on Detection of Antimicrobial Resistance, Department of
Microbiology and Infection Control, University Hospital of North Norway, Tromsø, Norway, 3 Research Group
of Host-Microbe Interactions, Department of Medical Biology, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of
Tromsø –The Artic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway, 4 Microbial Pharmacology and Population
Dynamics Research Group, Department of Pharmacy, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Tromsø –The
Artic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway, 5 Norwegian Reference Laboratory for MRSA, St. Olavs




Scandinavian countries have traditionally had a low prevalence of resistant organisms, but
have in recent years experienced a change in their epidemiology. We aim to describe the
epidemiology of carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs), vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (VRE) and methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) in Norway, measure the
importance of infections contracted abroad, and assess the morbidity and mortality associ-
ated with these resistant bacteria in Norway.
Methods and materials
We used data from the Norwegian surveillance system for communicable diseases covering
all findings of the selected resistant bacteria including both infections and colonisation, in
the period 2006–2017. Annual trends were assessed using negative binomial regression.
For MRSA, we were able to calculate the Morisita-Horn index and transmission numbers fol-
lowing importation in order to assess the effect this had on further domestic transmission.
Results
The incidence rates (per 100,000 personyears) of the three groups of resistant bacteria
have increased during the period. In 2017 the incidence rates were 0.82 for CPOs, 7.09 for
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VRE and 43.8 for MRSA. 81% of CPO cases were diagnosed in hospitals, but 73% were
infected abroad. Most VRE cases were infected in Norwegian hospitals, 85% were associ-
ated with hospitals outbreaks. MRSA was predominantly diagnosed in the community, only
21% were diagnosed in hospitals. Of all MRSA cases, 35% were infected in other countries.
Most MRSA spa-types were not identified again after introduction, resulting in a transmis-
sion of MRSA equivalent to a mean of 0.30 persons infected from each spa-type identified
(range: 0–22). The proportion of infections among all notified cases within each diagnose
was 44% for MRSA, 9% for VRE and 45% for CPOs. Among persons notified with bacterae-
mia, the 30 days all-cause mortality were 20%, 16% and 50% for MRSA, VRE and CPOs
respectively.
Discussion
The incidence rates of CPOs, VRE and MRSA in Norway are low, but increasing. The con-
tinuing increase of notified resistant bacteria highlights the need for a revision of existing
infection prevention and control guidelines.
Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance has been a challenge to the treatment of bacterial infections across
the globe for as long as we have used antibiotics. In recent years, resistance in some pathogenic
bacteria that are major causes of healthcare associated infections has become an increasing
threat to patients in healthcare institutions. It is in these institutions that the most vulnerable
patients are to be found and where it is of vital importance to have effective antibiotic options.
Of particular concern is the global increase in prevalence of carbapenem-resistant Enterobac-
terales, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Acinetobacter baumannii, vancomycin-resistant entero-
cocci (VRE) and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), all of which are resistant
to antibiotics defined as critically important for human medicine [1].
Historically, surveillance data has indicated that Norway, along with other Scandinavian
countries, has a low background prevalence of resistant organisms [2–4]. In recent years, how-
ever, it appears that the epidemiology has been changing [5–7]. Importantly, the incidence of
these different bug-drug combinations may be changing differently; at different rates, in differ-
ent populations and with differing effect. To counteract the dissemination of multi-drug resis-
tant organisms (MDROs), Scandinavian guidelines advocate the implementation of infection
control measures such as screening patients hospitalized abroad and targeted isolation on
admission to healthcare institutions [8]. With a changing epidemiology, the question arises of
whether these policies will still be effective in the years to come and whether the Scandinavian
countries will be able to maintain the current low prevalence of these organisms or if we will
see the same rates as those now being found in many other countries in Europe, Asia and the
Americas in the future [9].
The aim of this study is to describe the epidemiology of carbapenemase-producing organ-
isms (CPOs), VRE and MRSA in Norway, from 2006 up to and including 2017; and measure
the effect of importation of MDROs on the autochthonous epidemiology of a low-prevalence
country. Further, we aim to assess the morbidity and mortality associated with these MDROs
as a means of describing their impact on public health.
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Materials and methods
Register
We included data on all human cases (clinical infections and colonization) of CPOs, VRE and
MRSA from the Norwegian Surveillance System for Communicable Diseases (MSIS) covering
the period 2006–2017. In Norway, all first-time findings of CPO, VRE and MRSA are notifi-
able to MSIS and the register contains information on both the person (submitted by the treat-
ing physician) and the isolate (from the primary laboratory, the reference laboratory, or both),
linked by the patient’s unique personal identification (ID) number [10]. Persons with more
than one type of notifiable bacteria-resistance combination were treated as one notification
per bacteria-resistance type in the analysis. Case data in MSIS includes the patients sex, age,
admission to a healthcare institution, travel history, clinical picture, date of death (where appli-
cable), and specific information for each bacterial isolate, including the date the sample was
taken, species, clones, and resistance mechanism. Mortality data registered in MSIS is regularly
updated from the Norwegian National Population Registry. In this study we had access to
mortality data from the period 2006 up to and including 2016.
The use of data from MSIS is regulated by the MSIS-regulation §4.4. The use of data for this
work was approved by the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (ref.: 17/11726). The data
were analyzed anonymously.
Population under surveillance
Due to the comprehensive coverage of the MSIS register, there is no selection in this study. We
defined the study population as all people in Norway during the study period of 2006 until the
end of 2017. However, CPOs were only included in the list of notifiable conditions from 2012.
In order to calculate the mortality rate we only included those registered prior to 2017 with a
complete personal ID number (implying that they were residents in Norway) in these analyses.
For the 30-day and one-year mortality calculation we included persons with a sample taken at
least 30 days or 12 months before the end of 2016, respectively.
Case definitions in MSIS
Carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs) are defined as all clinical and screening isolates
of Enterobacterales (CPEs), P. aeruginosa or Acinetobacter spp. with reduced susceptibility or
resistance to meropenem and verified as carbapenemase-producing by the Norwegian
National Advisory Unit of Antimicrobial Resistance. Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE)
are defined as all enterococci expressing either the vanA or vanB gene and/or with a minimum
inhibitory concentration (MIC) for vancomycin of� 4 mg/l. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus (MRSA) are defined as all cases of S. aureus found to be resistant against cefoxitin
and expressing either the mecA or mecC gene and verified as MRSA by the Norwegian Refer-
ence Laboratory for MRSA.
Study-specific definitions
Classification of either infection or colonization at the time of notification was primarily based
on the diagnosis given by the reporting physician. We supplemented this information using
the material of the specimen and clinical information in the reporting form. Based on this
information the classification of severe infections included pneumonia, bloodstream infection,
meningitis, encephalitis and necrotising fasciitis. We used the name of the notifying ward
together with information of place of treatment given in the free-text fields, to identify patients
diagnosed in hospitals, including intensive care units (ICUs). Imported cases were cases where
Multi-drug resistant organisms in Norway
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741 February 4, 2019 3 / 17
the treating physician had reported the MDRO as acquired in another country. When the
country of acquisition was not specified, we defined the case as imported when the informa-
tion given in free-text fields indicated acquisition abroad. For the purpose of this study, we
defined livestock associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) in two groups: all isolates of clonal complex
(CC) 398; and all isolates Panton-Valentine Leukocidin (PVL) negative and from Staphylococ-
cus protein A (spa) types previously associated with outbreaks in Norwegian livestock, as
described by Elstrøm et al. [11].
Statistical analyses
Descriptive and analytical statistics were performed using Stata v15, Stata Corp. When assess-
ing the annual trend of notified cases, we used negative binomial regression after organizing
the data as yearly time-series data. The annual number of cases were tested and we found no
significant autocorrelation [12]. We used separate regression models for the yearly trend for
each diagnosis, each place of acquisition and each place of diagnosis, and with the yearly num-
ber of cases as numerator and the annual total population in Norway as the denominator
(Table C in S1 File). To assess the effect importation has on the epidemiology of MRSA in Nor-
way, we used the Morisita-Horn index as a measure of the abundance of overlapping MRSA
















where xi is the number of times spa-type i is represented in the total of imported cases (X), yi is
the number of times spa-type i is represented in the total of domestic cases (Y), and S is the
number of unique spa-types reported. Further, we identified unique spa-types found after
2007 which were not notified in the two first years of the study period, and where the first noti-
fied case was reported as infected abroad. When the spa-type was not present in the two first
years of the study period, we treated it as a new spa-type in Norway. We followed these newly
imported spa-types over the next 10 years and calculated a transmission number after intro-
duction to Norway, as the number of persons infected in Norway by each spa-type per person





where yi is the number of new domestic cases of the spa-type i notified after the first case were
imported, and xi is the number of imported cases of the spa-type i notified after 2007.
Results
Description of the epidemiology
From 2006 up to and including 2017, a total of 18,155 notifications in 17,082 persons with
CPOs, VRE or MRSA, were registered in MSIS. Of these, 15,547 people were notified with
MRSA. The incidence rates (number of persons per 100,000 personyears (IR)) in 2017 were
0.82 for CPOs, 7.09 for VRE and 43.80 for MRSA. During the study period there has been a
significant increase in the annual number of persons registered within each group (bug-
drug combination and infection/colonization), except for persons notified with CPO
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infections (Fig 1 and Table A in S1 File). However, in the last four years the incidence rate
of MRSA infections has plateaued, reflected in an incidence rate ratio (IRR) for MRSA
between 2014 and 2017 of 0.98 (95% CI 0.94–1.02).
A majority of the people notified with VRE or CPOs were males (�60%) and of high
median age (>60 years) (Table 1). MRSA notifications were evenly distributed between men
and women. The median age was 32 with an interquartile range (IQR) of 33 years. For all three
groups of MDROs the full age-range was from one year or below, to over 95 (Table 1 and Fig
A in S1 File).
Notification of CPOs was introduced in 2012, and the total number in the study period was
231 notifications from 195 persons. These included CPEs (n = 137), Acinetobacter spp.
(n = 69) and Pseudomonas spp. (n = 25). Almost all cases (96%) of carbapenemase-producing
Acinetobacter and Pseudomonas, and 81% of all CPEs were diagnosed in hospitals. Based on
the Ambler classification, the vast majority of carbapenemases belonged to class B or D (Fig 2).
The New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM) (n = 59), OXA-48-like (n = 57) and OXA-23-like
(n = 50) were the dominating carbapenemase variants identified, and the number of isolates
with these types of resistance mechanisms increased during the study period.
The specific Enterococcus species (faecium, faecalis etc.) has only been registered in MSIS
since the end of 2015. Thus, we can only describe species-specific VRE-data from the last two
years, where 476 persons with E. faecium were reported compared to eleven cases of E. faecalis.
In total 1,261 (94%) of the VRE cases were diagnosed in hospitals and over 85% of all persons
notified were associated with recognised hospital outbreaks. The majority of positive isolates
were found in asymptomatic carriers during case tracing. The first multi-ward outbreak of
VRE in Norway occurred in 2010, with an increasing number of hospital outbreaks every year
apart from 2016 (Fig 3). During the study period there was only one VRE-outbreak in a long-
term care facility (reported in 2017) and in total 22 persons were diagnosed with VRE during
their stay in long-term care institutions, including six residents linked to the reported out-
break. The first registered VRE-outbreak was a vanB associated outbreak at one hospital (hos-
pital A1) which altogether notified 74% of all cases identified in the study period harbouring
the vanB gene (Fig 3). This resulted in more cases of vanB than vanA at the national level even
though vanA has been involved in more outbreaks.
MRSA was predominantly diagnosed by general practitioners, only 3,282 (21%) of the
MRSA cases were diagnosed in hospitals and 794 (5%) were diagnosed during their stay in
long-term care institutions. In Norway, there are restrictions regarding patient related work
for MRSA positive healthcare workers, and thus they are screened before employment if
MRSA exposure is reported. In total, 737 (5%) of all persons notified with MRSA were
reported to be healthcare workers. Among all MRSA notifications, 779 (5%) could be linked to
known outbreaks of MRSA in hospitals (n = 40 outbreaks), in long-term care facilities (n = 92
outbreaks) or in different settings in the community (n = 10 outbreaks).
Sequencing of the repeat region of the spa-gene in order to genotype the isolates was performed
on isolates from 14,529 (93%) persons notified with MRSA. These isolates belonged to 1,092 dif-
ferent spa-types, where 805 (74%) were found less than 5 times during the study period (Fig B in
S1 File). The five spa-types most frequently reported were t002 (n = 1,382), t019 (n = 1,081), t008
(n = 1,003), t223 (n = 882) and t127 (n = 664). Norway has implemented a national strategy
against LA-MRSA [11, 13]. In the study period, we found MRSA spa-types belonging to the clonal
complex (CC) 398 in 185 persons notified to MSIS. Of these, 118 were PVL negative and belonged
to MRSA strains often associated with livestock in Europe [14]. A few outbreaks of MRSA in Nor-
wegian livestock have been discovered yearly since 2014. In total 52 persons diagnosed with
MRSA could be directly linked to known MRSA positive Norwegian pig herds (Table B in S1
File). So far, all LA-MRSA outbreaks have been successfully controlled [11, 13].
Multi-drug resistant organisms in Norway
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741 February 4, 2019 5 / 17
Multi-drug resistant organisms in Norway
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741 February 4, 2019 6 / 17
Imported versus domestic cases
We found a significant increase of notifications during the period in both persons infected
abroad and in those infected in Norway for all three groups of MDROs, except for persons
infected with VRE in Norway (Table 2). Countries in Asia were the most often reported coun-
tries of acquisition, followed by countries in the southern and eastern part of Europe.
Only a few cases of VRE (6%) were reported to be acquired abroad, while most CPO cases
(73%) were reported infected outside Norway. A total of 52 persons notified with CPOs were
not reported to be acquired abroad, equally distributed between infected in Norway and
unknown place of infection. Among the persons not reported infected abroad, 23 (44%) were
diagnosed with CPE, mainly E. coli or K. pneumoniae, producing the OXA-48-like carbapene-
mase. The total number of notifications of OXA-48-like CPOs (both domestic and imported
cases) has increased from three in 2006 to 24 in 2017. Based on the reported information, none
of the domestic cases or cases with unknown place of infection formed clusters of persons liv-
ing in the same municipalities or with known epidemiological links.
Persons diagnosed with MRSA were divided between 35% infected in Norway and 36%
infected in other countries, and the rest (29%) were reported with no information on place of
acquisition. The increase in both imported and domestic MRSA cases was significant both
among patients in hospitals, in long-term care facilities or diagnosed by their general practi-
tioners (Table 2). Although we see a decrease in imported MRSA cases in 2017, there was still a
steep rise of persons infected abroad over the whole study period (Table 2 and Fig 4).
There was a high diversity of MRSA spa-types in both imported and domestic cases. The Mor-
isita-Horn’s overlap index (a measure of similarity) for domestic and imported cases was close to
zero throughout the study period (Fig C in S1 File). During the first two years, 151 different spa-
types were identified. In the following ten years a total of 941 new spa-types were found. Among
these, 426 (45%) of the new spa-types were primarily identified in persons infected abroad while
236 (25%) were primarily identified in persons infected in Norway (Fig D in S1 File). A total of
324 of 426 (76%) of new spa-types diagnosed in persons infected abroad were not later identified
among persons infected in Norway. The mean transmission number (TN) for all new imported
spa-types from 2008 to 2017, calculated as the number of persons infected in Norway per persons
infected abroad per unique spa-type, was 0.30 and ranged from 0 to 22 (Fig 5).
Fig 1. Incidence rate (number of persons notified per 100,000 personyears) of CPO (A), VRE (B) and MRSA (C).
Note the different scales on the y-axis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.g001
Table 1. Number of cases and distribution of sex, age and place of diagnosis. Note that the values represent abso-
lute numbers and (percentages) for each diagnosis.
CPO VRE MRSA
No. of notifications 231 1,350 16,574
No. of persons 195 1,340 15,547
Males (%) 126 (65) 798 (60) 7,706 (50)
Mean age (min-max) 57 (1–96) 68 (0–97) 36 (0–104)
Median age (p25-p75) 62 (42–72) 72 (59–81) 32 (19–52)
Diagnosed by general practitioners (%) 25 (13) 57 (4) 11,471 (74)
Diagnosed in hospitals (%) 168 (86) 1,261 (94) 3,282 (21)
Diagnosed in intensive care units (ICUs) (%) 21 (11) 30 (2) 120 (1)
Diagnosed in long-term care facilities (%) 2 (1) 22 (2) 794 (5)
Registered as healthcare workers (%) 2 (1) 1 (0) 737 (5)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.t001
Multi-drug resistant organisms in Norway
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Morbidity and mortality
During the study period, 41% of the notifications were clinical infections. The proportion of
infections was highest among patients diagnosed with CPO or MRSA (45 and 44% respec-
tively), while only nine percent of VRE cases were notified as infections. However, VRE had
the highest proportion of reported bacteraemia amongst those notified with infection (30%),
whilst 16% of all CPO infections and only 2% of those notified with MRSA infections were
bacteraemia. 30-day mortality among patients notified with bacteraemia was highest in those
with CPO infections (50%) followed by MRSA (20%) and VRE (16%). Table 3 shows the mor-
bidity and mortality outcomes for the different subpopulations in this study.
Discussion
Compared to most other countries, Norway still has a low incidence rate of CPOs, VRE and
MRSA [2, 15]. However, our data show an increasing trend of notifications for all of these
Fig 2. CPOs distributed according to the Ambler classification.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.g002
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MDROs, and the increase is ongoing despite the development and implementation of compre-
hensive infection prevention and control measures, including antibiotic stewardship, in Nor-
wegian health care [16].
Several countries which today are considered to have a high endemic level of MDROs in
hospitals, had comparable rates in the recent past to those seen in Scandinavian countries
today [17]. Based on the present epidemiological situation in low-endemic countries, it is
opportune to ask if the control regimes implemented against resistant bacteria will continue to
be effective, or if new approaches are needed. The different Scandinavian guidelines against
MDROs all advise several bundles of measures in hospitals and long-term care institutions,
while control of transmission in the community is less established [8]. In addition, many of the
measures advised in these guidelines lack evidence for their effectiveness [18–21]. The Scandi-
navian countries may have reached a crossroads where we either continue to follow the current
prevention and control measures and trust that they are maintaining a low level of severe
MDRO infections, or we reinforce the current practice with both an evaluation of the routines
Fig 3. Number of persons registered with VRE in hospitals per week from week 1 in 2010 and up to 2018 (2010w1 – 2018w1), distributed by hospitals and genes for
vancomycin resistance. The hospitals have been grouped in the three Health trust regions with registered VRE-outbreaks in the period, and hospitals in each region with
less than 20 cases have been aggregated together. Each coloured box represent one person.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.g003
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in healthcare institutions together with measures that prevent and control the spread of CPOs,
VRE and MRSA in the community. The latter may be needed in order to prevent an increasing
infection pressure and influx from the community into hospitals and long-term care institu-
tions. However, the analysis in this study makes it clear that different factors influence the
notification rate of each type of MDRO, and a common approach to prevent the spread of
CPOs, VRE and MRSA in different settings and populations may not be optimal for each
pathogen.
The epidemiology of VRE in Norway has so far mainly been a local problem driven by out-
breaks in a few hospitals. Notified cases in the last two years have been dominated by Entero-
coccus faecium. Several studies from other countries have identified a shift in the distribution
of species from E. faecalis to more resistant clones of E. faecium [22, 23]. This shift is explained
by an increased selection and spread of hospital adapted clones of E. faecium [24–26]. One rea-
son why we may have seen a rise in the prevalence of VRE in our hospitals, is the previously
mentioned adaptation of E. faecium to our hospital environment. This adaptation is probably
due to the development of resistance to different biocides, including alcohols, and antibiotics
along with an ability to survive on dry surfaces for up to several years [27, 28]. Most cases in
Norway are also identified with the vanB resistance gene cluster and only a few cases of VRE
seem to be due to infection abroad. The onset of an outbreak with vanB VRE often occurs due
to transfer of the vanB gene cluster from the normal gut flora in a patient during antibiotic
treatment [29]. In addition vanB VRE might be more difficult to detect phenotypically because
of low level vancomycin resistance, which increase the risk of spread in the hospital setting
before outbreaks are discovered. As seen in Fig 3, in the last few years we have identified an
Table 2. Results of negative binomial regression of the annual number of cases, 2006–2017, distributed by diagno-
sis, place of acquisition and place of diagnosis. LA-MRSA included persons notified with PVL-negative isolates
belonging to CC398 or CC1 and the same spa-types found in known outbreaks in Norwegian swineherds (spa-types
t011, t034, t12359, t177).
DIAGNOSIS IRR (Ratio of mean annual cases) 95% CI p-value
CPO
Persons infected in other countries 1.25 1.11–1.41 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.31 1.04–1.66 <0.05
VRE
Persons infected in other countries 1.54 1.38–1.71 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.32 0.99–1.74 0.06
MRSA
Persons infected in other countries 1.18 1.15–1.20 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.06 1.04–1.07 <0.05
MRSA diagnosed by general practitioners
Total number of persons notified 1.17 1.15–1.18 <0.05
Persons infected in other countries 1.19 1.16–1.22 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.09 1.07–1.11 <0.05
MRSA diagnosed in hospitals
Total number of persons notified 1.12 1.10–1.14 <0.05
Persons infected in other countries 1.14 1.10–1.17 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.03 1.01–1.05 <0.05
LA-MRSA associated with outbreaks in livestock in Norway
Total number of persons notified 1.53 1.26–1.86 <0.05
Persons infected in other countries 1.31 1.14–1.49 <0.05
Persons infected in Norway 1.47 1.12–1.93 <0.05
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.t002
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increase of vanB VRE with a MIC below 4 mg/l. The dissemination of low level resistant VRE
might be one of the explanations why we have had a large ongoing VRE outbreak in a hospital
in Norway and several vanB VRE outbreaks in other Scandinavian hospitals. The solutions to
Fig 4. Incidence rate (number of persons notified per 100,000 personyears) of MRSA, by place of acquisition.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.g004
Fig 5. Transmission number (domestic cases/imported cases) per unique MRSA spa-type not previously identified and primarily
diagnosed in persons infected abroad, in the period 2008–2017.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.g005
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this challenge, presented in international studies, are prudent antibiotic use and both standard
and contact precautions [18, 30, 31]. However, their relevance for low prevalence settings
remains unclear. An important question is how the strong effort in VRE prevention and con-
trol already in place in many Scandinavian hospitals can be further improved.
Contrary to VRE, CPOs in Norway are currently mainly diagnosed in patients directly
transferred from foreign hospitals or with a history of hospitalization in other countries [7, 32,
33]. So far, only a few cases were assessed as infected domestically. This highlights the impor-
tance of screening for MDROs, including CPOs, especially when patients have been treated in
hospitals abroad. However, the epidemiology described here can also be an artefact of the sur-
veillance system itself. The guidelines and awareness of CPOs may not be sensitive enough to
identify carriers that have not been in a hospital abroad, but have been infected in other ways.
The Norwegian surveillance system of resistance in microbes (NORM) agrees that the preva-
lence of CPOs is still low in Norway, but also reveals a steady increase of extended-spectrum β-
lactamase (ESBL) production in the selected clinical isolates of E. coli and K. pneumoniae col-
lected during the last decade [34]. Scandinavian countries might be in a unique situation with
a low prevalence of CPOs, but we must expect it to increase rapidly and in the same way as
seen in many European countries, unless current guidelines are continuously evaluated,
updated and adhered to. Further, we need to define cost-appropriate measures that can be
applied in this setting.
Detailed and comprehensive MRSA guidelines are well implemented in Norwegian hospi-
tals and the results in our study indicate that both hospitals and long-term care institutions to
a large extent manage to control the transmission of MRSA between inpatients. However, it
seems that one of the main factors influencing the incidence rate is increasing importation of
MRSA from other countries. Most notified cases are diagnosed in the community where few
measures are in place to prevent further transmission.
MRSA colonization is mainly found through targeted screening and the number of MRSA
cases reported in this study may suffer from detection bias. A revision of the national MRSA
guidelines was published in 2009 and implemented gradually in the different health regions
over the following years. The increase in the number of notified persons with MRSA has
Table 3. Number of persons notified with infections or reported dead within 30 days or 1 year after date of diag-
nosis. Mortality is calculated for persons with a complete national identification number and diagnosed with a MDRO
1 year or 30 days prior to death. Severe infections identified in MSIS included pneumonia, bloodstream infections,
meningitis, encephalitis and necrotising fasciitis.
CPO VRE MRSA




Severe infections (% of cases with infections) 20
(23)
38 (31) 217 (3)
Bacteraemia (% of cases with infections) 14
(16)
37 (30) 140 (2)





30 days all-cause mortality (% of all notified cases) 22
(11)
113 (8) 178 (1)
30 days all-cause mortality in hospitalized patients (% of cases diagnosed in hospitals) 22
(13)
111 (9) 117 (4)
30 days all-cause mortality in patients with infections (% of cases with infections) 16
(18)
14 (11) 106 (2)
30 days all-cause mortality in patients with notified bacteraemia (% of cases with
bacteraemia)
7 (50) 6 (16) 28 (20)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211741.t003
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probably been influenced by a gradually more active screening policy. However, the indication
for taking clinical samples has not changed and the annual IR of MRSA infections has also
increased. This would support the finding of an overall increase in the incidence of MRSA in
Norway. Over the last four years, the rate of increase in infections has tailed off compared to
notifications of colonizations, which may mean that we are reaching a steady state for MRSA
in the country.
The number of people that one infected person will infect (the reproduction number) may
vary between the MDROs, and it is influenced by the settings (i.e. hospitals versus community)
and by the population at risk affected by immunity status, invasive medical treatment etc. The
definition of the reproduction numbers for MDROs is made even more difficult to assess
because of the asymptomatic carrier state. In this study, we used the data available in MSIS to
measure the distribution of imported and domestic MRSA cases together with genotypes of
isolates to assess the cumulative number of new domestic cases after importation. The low
Morisita-Horn index together with a low transmission number for most newly imported spa-
types indicates that the reproduction number of MRSA in the community and in healthcare
institutions is often below 1, which means that further spread within each setting should stop
[35]. This is comparable to the reproduction number assessed per hospital stay for MRSA posi-
tive inpatients in the Netherlands [36]. However, we also found an annual increase in the IR
during the study period. Our assessment of the transmission number was based on MRSA spa-
types imported for the first time after 2007, and the five most common notified MRSA spa-
types in Norway were already established in 2006/2007 and thus not included in the calcula-
tion of the transmission number. This may have contributed to an underestimation of the
potential for transmission of MRSA. Even though most imported MRSA strains after 2007
seem not to have led to significant domestic spread, our results show that the potential for
transmission varies a lot between the strains. Although we experience that many MDROs
imported to Scandinavian countries do not lead to further domestic spread, we also identify
continuing transmission of single strains in the community and outbreaks in healthcare insti-
tutions [5].
The Norwegian government have launched a national AMR strategy where the main objec-
tive is to decrease the antibiotic use by 30%. The work on antibiotic stewardship is important
to prevent the development and selection of antibiotic resistant bacteria. However, even If we
manage to reach this target, the epidemiology of MDROs will still be largely influenced by
importation, especially when it comes to CPOs and MRSA. Thus, other measures to prevent
and control multi-resistant bacteria, including screening and standard precautions, are also
important for reducing the growth of AMR in Norwegian healthcare institutions.
At present, it seems that the resistance in the Gram-positive bacteria investigated in this
study had less impact on disease outcome compared to what is reported in most other interna-
tional studies [37–41]. Although all cases of selected MDROs diagnosed in Norway are
reported to MSIS, the data in the surveillance system suffer from detection bias which may
both overestimate and underestimate the assessed morbidity and mortality. A large proportion
of the persons notified with CPOs seems to be elderly patients with a statistically higher risk of
infection. Many of the patients notified with CPOs have been directly transferred from foreign
hospitals, which may indicate severe trauma or diseases demanding comprehensive and inva-
sive treatment. Thus, the high risk of mortality after CPO bacteraemia, may not just be due to
lack of first-line antibiotic treatment but may also be influenced by the generally high vulnera-
bility in this group of patients. The risk of mortality after VRE bacteraemia is lower than
assessed in several international studies [42, 43]. However, some studies have shown that the
risk of mortality attributable to vanB VRE (responsible for the largest single outbreak) is not
increased compared to antibiotic susceptible Enterococcus [44]. In notified cases of MRSA
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bacteraemia we find a mortality within 30 days comparable to what other Norwegian studies
have found in methicillin sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) [45, 46]. A lower percentage of severe
infections among both VRE and MRSA cases, may partly be due to our screening and case-
finding policies. The notified cases of these two diseases have a higher amount of carriers than
what is reported for persons with CPOs. The active surveillance in Norway with comprehen-
sive search for MRSA and VRE may contribute to a known carrier status in patients when clin-
ical signs of infections occur, and thus increases the possibility to choose an empirical
treatment the bacteria are susceptible to. If this is a factor influencing the low risk of mortality
attributable to MRSA or VRE in countries with active surveillance, it will be an important posi-
tive effect of a comprehensive search strategy. However, with increasing domestic spread of
MDROs, it will be more difficult to perform a targeted screening that effectively detect most
asymptomatic carriers. This will lead to more introduction and spread of MDROs in hospitals
and increased risk of infections and deaths comparable to what is reported from countries out-
side Scandinavia.
It is difficult to predict the future MDRO situation in the Scandinavian countries, but with-
out increasing awareness and implementation of effective prevention measures, we will proba-
bly not be able to decelerate the importation and spread of MDROs. The continuing increase
of notified cases over the last 12 years, highlights the need of revision of the existing infection
prevention and control. This applies both to an evaluation of the standard precautions and the
MDRO specific control measures implemented in health care. The Norwegian government
has this year started the development of a national action plan for infection prevention and
control. The authors hope this will contribute to keep these MDROs under control. However,
we lack high quality studies assessing the effect of MDRO prevention and control measures in
low endemic settings, and we need to strengthen the capacity and possibility to perform such
studies in the Scandinavian countries.
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